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THE WINTER W,AR IN THE EAST
NQVember 1,1943, to April 15, 194-1
In the December 1943 Y8Ue we gave an accOtmt oj the 8Unl71ler campaign of
194!J carryi'lfJ the 8tory up t.o November 1. The JoUowing analY8i8 i8 a very brief
one, a8 t"e winter war 'liI08 conducted along principlC8 8imilar 10 t"08e d'iac'U88ed in
connection with the 8ummer campaign.
THE x.."{th CENTURY
An interesting factor is the cool reception
accorded in Moscow to the news from the in.
vasion front. The Soviets have been wait.
ing so long for the invasion that they can
no longer work up much enthusiasm over it.
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attacks on their towns and villages, the
French were placed in a new predicament
by the invasion, and tens of thousands of
French civilians have already lost their lives
in the course of the batHes.
THE PLANS
A FTER Stalingrnd, the German HighCommand Ba,W quite clearly that underthe prevailing circumstances a further
offensive int,o the depths of the USSR could
not be expected to bring about decisive
results. It decided to withdraw its armies
far back toward the west, nearer to its
base" and system of communications, and
thus to economize in men and material in
\'iew of the expected demand for German
troops in other pam of the Continent. This
"Tithdrawal, however, was to be carried out
in constant combat with the Red armies,
inflicting 011 them as large losses as possible.
Moreover, it did not mean that the Germans
h8\'o abandoned the idea of offensives,
but merely that they are waiting for
the opportune time and place for them.
This is the strategy the German High Com-
mand had successfully employed during the
summer campaign of 1943, and it planned
to adhere to it in the course of the winter
too.
The Soviet High Command, on the other
hand, was in a dl.fferent position. By
exerting frontal pre88ure over a very ex-
tended front, from Velikiye Luki to the Sea
of Azov, it had been able to gain much
ground during the summer but had not
succeeded in destroying German manpower
to any noteworthy extent. Even according
to their own figures, the Soviets had, ill the
period from July 5 to November 5, 1943,
captured only an average of 790 men a day, of
whom more than half were wounded. But now
the winter, alwa.ys the most favorable season
for H.ussian armies, was approaching, and the
Kremlin apparently laid it.s pian along a
new line. This plan has been made evident
by the course of C\Tents since November 3,
and it consisted of this: while a certain
amount of pressure all along the front was
to prevent the Germans (rom denuding BOrne
parts of the front in favor of others, the
real attack was to be made by the First
Ukrainian Army under General Vatutin in
the Kiev area. The overwhelmingly superior
quantities of men and material assom bled here
were to push westward and then to wheel
around toward the south in order to out 011
and annihilate the German armies in the
Dniepr bend.
In a way, the SOl'iets tried to rcJX'at their
Stalingrad maneuver. Again the GermanI
were standing in a triangle pointing east-
ward. In the winter of 1942/43 this triangle
followed the bend of the Don and had its
apex at Stalingrad. In the autumn of
1943 the triangle followed the banks of the
Dniepr and had its point in the easternmost
corner of this river's bend. In the case of
Stalingrad the Russian success Wall brought
about by the breakthrough at Bogutchar,
whence the triangle was cut off at its nar-
row base, and a subsidiary breakthrough at
Serafimovich, halfway between Bogutchar
and Stalingrad. (See our article "The Win-
ter War," May 1943.) The plans in the
autumn of 1943 called for similar break-
throughs in the left flank of the southern
German armies, preceded by a push toward
the west with the purpose of enlarging t,he
area and number of troops to be cut off.
sonET OPERATIONS
On November 3 the Red offensive in the
Kiev area began. It made rapid headway
in the direction of Jitomir, which was
evacuated by the Germans ton days later.
But while the Soviets were celebrating II.
great victory and the collapse of the Ger-
man front, they were hit by Field Marshal
Manstein in the left flank of their w<-'<Ige
THE MARCH OF WAR
'lbe winter Wl1I' from NO\'~mber 1. 1943, to April 15, 1944.
Tho approximate couroe of tho front on tlle liNt of CArh monlh
1;0 8hoWD b)' A thick red IIno, on the 15th of each monU. by
"UUII ~ Une. Broken red lines Weflt of Kiev rudlc_to tow-
poru)" Soviet retreat.
•
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pushing either west in the direction of
Lemberg, i.e., along the northern slopes
of the Carpathians, or southwest toward
the Carpathian passes, or south down
the Pruth and Dniestr vaUeys toward
the Black Sea. Whatever their original
intention, our map makes it clear that
toward the west they got stuck first on the
line SamyfLutskfRovno/Sbepetovka and then
on the line KovelfBrody(l'arnopol.
The Reds now threw the weight of their
force& toward the south to cut off the Ger-
with such force that they reeled back half-
"",y to Kiev. The first attempt of the
8crriets to execute their plan had misca.rried.
It was only toward the end of December
that the Soviets were ready for their second
try. On January 2, Jitomir was onoe more
evacuated by the Germans. Again the
&met thrust moved at a rapid initial speed,
reaching the line Sarny(Kostopol by the
middle of January. At the same time they
made their firsi subsidiary push toward
the south, in the direction of Uman.
But while the German armies
had allowed them to move
quite far westward, they offered
determined and successful resist-
ance to this thrust toward the south.
The troops to do this were mainly
the ten divisions of General Stem.
mermann, which occupied a wide
square from the Dniepr (between
Kanev and Cherkasy) westward.
In the meantime" tho armies of
General Konev had extended the
bridgehead established in 'October
west of the Dniepr between Krem-
enchug and Dnieprodzerdjinsk,
and on January 28 a junction was
brought about between Vatutin's
and Konev's armies to the rear of
General Stemmermann. But, in
the first place, by their presence
and power his forces interfered
considerably with the movements
of the two Soviet armies; in the
second, they succeeded on Feb·
ruary 18, after suffering relatively
small losses, in breaking through
to the main German lines; and in
the third, their efforts had shown
results. The southward push of
Vatutin's left wing toward Uman
had been st,opped. This can be
seen clearly on our map. Where
the red lines, based on the Soviet
war communiques, are far apart,
the Soviet advance was rapid;
wherever they run close to each
other the Soviets were halted for
a considerable time.
Early in February, Vatutin's
armies resumed their westward
push. It carried them further into
Poland. Rovno and Lutsk were
evacuated by the Germans on Feb.
ruary 3. The world waited for
the Soviets' next move. Theoret-
ioally they had the 'choice of
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man triangle which still had its easternmost
point at Kherson. Our map shows that
between March I and April 15 the Reds
were able to gain considerable ground, but
nowhere did they succeed in breaking
through. The thin chain of the German·
Rumanian troops gave way, bent, and
stretched, but never broke. Moreover, it
withdrew to the south sufficiently slowly
for the rest of the German-Rumanian forces
to evacuate from Kherson and the Bug
vaUey. In the end, the front ran almost
from cast to west, and the German soutbern
armies were separated by 300 kilometers
(YassyjStanislau) from the German divisiolls
on the central front. But between the Ger-
man armies on tbe central and on the south·
ern front, there was no gap through which
the Red forces couhi IHwe advanced into
Europe: there was the mighty waU of the
Cmpatbians with its few, well-defended
passes. Behind this wall, the lines of
communication between Germany and the
southern armies remained intact.
By the middle of April the real winter
cam paign had come to a close. The Reds
still made a numuer of attempts to pUlSh
the German-Rumanian forces further back,
but not with full force and without
success.
On the other sections of the Ea-'ltern
Front, particularly in the area of Vitebsk
and Moghilyov, the cornerstones of the
German central front, Soviet attacks were
frequently reported during tho winter and
spring but, as our map shows, the front did
not witness any changes in this sector.
Ever since the mictdle of January, the front
ran from Domurovitsa via "Moghilyovj
Vitebsk to Novosokolniki. It was only in
the NovosokolnikijLeningrad !lootor that the
front line moved. On "January 14 the Red
armies bad begun large-goale operations in
this sector, the purpose of which was to cut
off and destroy tho loft wing of the German
front and perhaps to break through to the
Baltio. Again tbe Soviets started with con-
siderable init.ial success; but they were soon
stopped, and the war settled down on the
IjnoNarvafLak~PeipusjPskov jNovosokolniki.
At the extreme other end of the front, in
the Crimea, the Soviets had been attacking
the small isolated German-Rumanian force
ever since November I with more than thirty
divisions. But it was only on :May I:l that
the last German troops evacuated the penin-
sula.
THE BALA1'lCE
The Soviets had conquered a large area
which had formerly been the agricultural
and industrial center of the USSR. But
they found these territories terribly muti.
lated by the war and almost depopulated,
t.he inhabitants having left the eOlmtry in
endless columns before the Red flood.
Nevertheless, on the map the Soviet
gains remain most impressive, and they
were utilized-although without success-
for the "war of nerves" against Finland and
the Balka.n nations. But if they were frank,
the Soviet leaders had to admit that. the
chief aim toward which they had shiven 80
tenaciously-the envelopment and destruc·
tion of the German southern armies-had
not been achieved. The Soviets had spent
the entire winter in It series of attempts in
this direction. They had thrown enormous
quantities of men and equipment,-particular.
Iy of artillery, which has become their main
weapon of late-against the thin Gennan-
Rumanian front, and they had sacrificed
untold numbers of their soldiers in attempted
breakthrougbs. (On June 26, 1944, Berlin
a.nnounced the total Soviet losses during
the first three years of the war to have
been 6.650,000 prisoners, about 12,700,000
killed, 93,420 tanks, 88,646 guns, and 57,954
planes.) But, although many circumstances
had favored them and various opportunities
had appea.red most promising, they did not
succeed. Thanks to the huge numerical
superiority of their armies, the Soviet generals
were able to steamroll forward over wide
areas, but they were not able to execute
successful large-scale maneuvers. Stalingrad
was the sole exception.
The German High Command has nc·
complished what it set out to do. Not for
a moment did it abandon its principle of
preserving, at the price of territory, its
armed forces, in mder to save them up for
an opportune moment. It was not easy for
the German leaders to sacrifice wide areas
of great economic, political, and military
significance. The decision to do this after
Stalingrad was one of the most difficult and
at the same time most far-reaching decisions
('vcr made by an army command. The
German people accepted this decision with
calm determination, rea.ljzing that, in view
of the circumstances obtainjng on the other
frontiers of Europe, this was the best way
to carryon the wllr in the East.
